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Strict and general application of the main Kantian assumption leads to the elimination of the Kantian-style metaphysics as well. The above counter argument by Loux leads to metaphysical skepticism. The other counter argument that can be used against Kantian-style objection leads to infinite regress. Kantians claim that while doing metaphysics we cannot study reality itself but only the concepts of it. But since we need a conceptual framework to be able to speak about reality, is it not the case that we need another conceptual framework to be able to approach the previous conceptual framework? And here comes the problem of consistency. Kantians need to be consistent and if they require a framework to approach the reality, there must be another framework for analyzing the framework used for reality. Therefore, Kantians cannot deny the possibility of traditional metaphysics and at the same time allow for a direct analysis of the conceptual framework. And hence, Kantian view seems to end up in an infinite regress.
I think the counter arguments are convincing and they properly show why the Kantians objections are wrong. But Is there a way out of skepticism and infinite regress? The third option is to defend dogmatism. Proponents of this solution would contend that there is a special sort of entities that metaphysicians are able to access without any problem. In a certain sense traditional metaphysics might be viewed as a form of dogmatism, it assumes that it is possible to study being as being. It seems, however, that dogmatism is precisely the view Kantians want to criticize. On the other hand, if they stated that the conceptual scheme is the special type of thing that could be studied directly they would seem to embrace the same attitude as a traditional metaphysician, only towards a different type of entity. But why should one accept that it is possible to study directly a conceptual framework but not the being as such? Kantians would need to supply an argument to show that it is possible to choose just their favorite option. Otherwise, their choice would be entirely ad hoc and in a sense.
In Conclusion, the criticisms of traditional metaphysics outlined in the second paragraph seem to be based on the Kantian view that we cannot learn about the being as such because we must apply our conceptual schemes to its study. Nevertheless, the Kantian approach to metaphysics suffers from a similar problem. If we cannot get to reality as such, either we cannot know the genuine nature of the conceptual scheme or we are able to learn only how the scheme could be seen from the point of view of another conceptual scheme. In each case we lack the pure and final metaphysical knowledge we allegedly looked for. All these problems, however, do not necessarily force us to abandon metaphysics as such. The only thing we should dismiss is the uncritical attitude. In case we realize that the metaphysical knowledge is revisable and not certain, we may engage in doing modest but viable critical metaphysics.
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